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INTRODUCTION
When we encrypt a message using a public-key encryption scheme, we allow the receiver to learn our message only if he knows a secret key corresponding to his public key. What if we don't really care if he knows a secret key, but we do care if he knows a solution to a crossword puzzle that we saw in the Times? Or if he knows a short proof for the Goldbach conjecture? Or, in general, the solution to some NP search problem? In this paper, we ask the question:
Can we encrypt a message so that it can only be opened by a recipient who knows a witness to an NP relation?
We introduce the concept of witness encryption for general NP languages. A witness encryption scheme is defined for an NP language L (with corresponding witness relation R). In such a scheme, a user can encrypt a message M to a particular problem instance x to produce a ciphertext. A recipient of a ciphertext is able to decrypt the message if x is in the language and the recipient knows a witness w where R(x, w) holds. However, if x is not in the language, then no polynomial-time attacker can distinguish between encryptions of any two equal length messages 1 . We emphasize that the encrypter himself may have no idea whether x is actually in the language.
In this paper we construct, and explore the applications of, witness encryption for NP-complete problems. Targeting witness encryption for NP-complete problems is appealing. First, we can create encryption puzzles of the type mentioned above. There are multiple real life examples where a monetary award has been offered for the solution to a puzzle or problem including: the Clay Institute Millennium Prize Problems [25] and the Eternity Puzzle [36] . For these challenges one could consider encoding the problem in terms of an NP-complete problem and encrypting the password to a bank account containing the funds. Witness encryption is especially well-suited to the situation where the encrypter may not be available (or even alive) at the time when a decrypter uses a witness to decrypt the ciphertext. This distinguishes the goal of witness encryption from the interactive setting, where general secure two-party computation protocols [37, 16] may be used for this purpose [2] .
Witness Encryption is closely related to the notion of computational secret sharing for NP-complete access structures, first posed by Rudich in 1989 [31] (see [3] ). For example, consider the NP-complete 3-Exact Cover problem (Proposition 2.25, [14] ), where an instance is defined by a set of subsets T 1, . . . , T of [n] such that each |Ti| = 3, and the problem is to find an exact cover Ti 1 , . . . , Ti t such that each element of the universe [n] is contained in exactly one set Ti j . The corresponding secret sharing problem would identify each of the n 3 subsets T of [n] of size 3 with a different party PT . The secret sharing scheme would require a way to take a secret x and construct potential shares λT for each party PT . The two guarantees needed would be: (1) efficient recovery: if a set of parties PT i 1 , . . . , PT i t knew of an exact cover among their sets, then these parties would be able to efficiently recover the secret x from their shares λT i 1 , . . . , λT i t . Note that the monotonicity of recovery is maintained here -if a set of parties contains an exact cover, so must any other superset of these parties. (2) privacy: if a set of parties PT i 1 , . . . , PT i t does not contain an exact cover, then these parties should not be able to distinguish between secret sharings of distinct secrets x and x .
It is easy to see that such a Rudich-type secret sharing scheme would imply a Witness Encryption scheme; the converse, however, is not clear. However, as we note below, our construction of Witness Encryption extends to yield a Rudich-type secret sharing scheme, as well, under the same computational assumption. This yields the first candidate construction for Rudich's open problem since its posing in 1989. Later in this introduction, we briefly compare Witness Encryption to other similar concepts that have appeared in the literature.
Witness encryption is also a surprisingly useful tool for 1 We note that this formalization does not capture the requirement that the decrypter must have knowledge of the witness w. Formalizing knowledge requirements in cryptography is often quite problematic, especially in noninteractive settings (see, e.g., [21] ). Indeed, we see this clean formulation of witness encryption without explicit discussion of knowledge as an important feature of our work. We defer exploring more complex knowledge-based formulations of witness encryption to future work.
building cryptographic schemes. Indeed, we show witness encryption gives intriguing new solutions with novel properties for cryptographic primitives including public key encryption [10, 17] , Identity-Based Encryption [33, 4] and AttributeBased Encryption [32] for circuits. (Our work can be seen as extending and refining the work of Rudich [31, 3] who showed how Rudich-type secret sharing schemes can be used for constructing novel OT protocols.) Our contributions in this paper are threefold. First, we introduce and formally define witness encryption. Second, we show how to build several cryptographic primitives from witness encryption. Finally, we give a candidate construction based on the NP-complete Exact Cover problem [29] and Garg, Gentry, and Halevi's [11] recent construction of "approximate" multilinear maps
We now provide an overview of how to build several cryptographic primitives from witness encryption, and then how to build the witness encryption scheme itself.
Building Cryptographic Primitives from Witness Encryption
We demonstrate the power of witness encryption as a flexible tool for building cryptographic primitives. We consider a progression of cryptographic applications, starting with the basic case of Public-Key Encryption, moving next to Identity-Based Encryption, and finally showing how to realize Attribute-Based Encryption for general circuits. Each new step in the progression is more challenging and requires new techniques.
We also point out interesting and unique features of each system that emerge from our use of witness encryption. For instance, existing public-key encryption schemes, like RSA, all have "heavy" key generation algorithms, that require nontrivial structured mathematical computations. For instance, RSA key generation involves choosing large random prime numbers. In contrast, our public-key encryption scheme based on witness encryption has a key generation algorithm whose complexity is independent of the complexity of the underlying witness encryption scheme: it requires only a single evaluation of a pseudo-random generator (PRG), a primitive whose existence can be based on one-way functions [22] . This also gives rise to an intriguing possibility: if it were possible to build witness encryption from one-way functions, then this would yield public-key encryption from one-way functions. We emphasize this possibility not because we think it likely that witness encryption could be easily built from one-way functions, but because the use of witness encryption to build public-key encryption is inherently non-black-box in the one-way function. Thus, this route to achieving public-key encryption from one-way functions would not contradict the famed black-box impossibility result of Impagliazzo and Rudich [24] .
Similarly, in our IBE system, private keys can be constructed from any unique signature scheme and are not tied to any specific algebraic structure or the complexity of the witness encryption scheme. Indeed, the setup and key generation algorithm are oblivious to what underlying witness encryption system is used. Suppose we built an IBE system of this nature with a particular witness encryption system. Now suppose that later on the community discovered a witness encryption system that was better in some way (e.g. had better performance or security assurances). This new witness encryption system could be swapped in without requiring any changes to the public parameters or private keys. Actually, the system is even more dynamic in that individual users can choose which witness encryption system they want to use on a per-ciphertext basis. We contrast this with contemporary IBE systems where the public parameters are intimately linked with either a certain choice of pairing friendly elliptic curve [4] , choice of Learning with Error (LWE) parameters [6, 1] , or RSA modulus [8] . If, for example, a certain class of elliptic curves were later discovered to be vulnerable to attacks, any system using them would need to be completely rekeyed starting with the authority.
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Technical Overview of Applications. We now give an overview of the progression of ideas for our constructions, with the details following in Section 4.
Public-Key Encryption. We begin by showing how witness encryption and pseudorandom generators (PRGs) give rise to public-key encryption. We assume a length doubling PRG G : {0, 1} λ → {0, 1} 2·λ , however, any PRG that expands by a super-logarithmic number of bits will suffice. To generate a key one simply chooses a random seed s as the secret key and lets the public key be the output of G(s) → t. Encryption is simply a witness encryption that t is in the output space of the PRG. A user with the secret key s can prepare a witness and decrypt the message. We prove security using a simple hybrid technique. We first switch generating t honestly to choosing t as a uniformly random string in {0, 1}
2·λ ; with very high probability is will not be in the range of G. By the security of the PRG, the attacker's advantage should remain the same. At this point, the NP statement is no longer be true and our witness encryption security definition directly applies.
Identity-Based Encryption. Moving on to Identity-Based Encryption, we must now be able to give out several secret keys. Our approach is to turn Naor's 3 observation that IBEs give rise to signature schemes on its head and derive IBE secret keys from essentially any signature scheme with unique signatures. As a first attempt, one might try to let a secret key for identity I be a signature on I. Then we can create a ciphertext by using witness encryption on an NP statement that there exists a signature σ on I. While our correctness property states that one can decrypt, security is harder to argue. The reason is that an attacker could know that the statement is true, that there exists a signature on I, without having any clue what the signature actually is.
As a next iteration on the idea, we will try to modify the construction by showing that from any attacker that breaks our system, we can actually extract a forgery on the challenge identity I * . Our method is for the encrypter to choose randomness r and to create two witness encryptions: one for the statement that there exists a signature σ in I where the Goldreich-Levin [15] hard-core bit of σ, r is 0, and the other witness encryption for the statement where it is 1. A user with a signature σ will choose the appropriate one. This idea, however, actually hits another snag in that there could be several signatures which verify for any I.
For this reason, we will use unique signature schemes [18] 4 where on honest setup there will be at most one verifying signature per message. Therefore only one of the two witness encryption statements can be true. At this point we can extract a forgery for any attacking user.
Attribute-Based Encryption for Circuits. We finally move to the most complex case of achieving Attribute-Based Encryption for general circuits. Until very recently [12, 19] , no solutions to this problem were known. In this setting, a private key corresponds to a (bounded-size) boolean circuit f that takes n bit inputs, and a ciphertext corresponds to an n bit input a. If f (a) = 1 then the user should be able to decrypt.
If we were to follow in the steps of our IBE solution, we might give a private key for circuit f as a unique signature on f , and for the proof try to extract a signature forgery from an attacker that decrypts the (selectively chosen) challenge input a * . The problem with this approach is that even if the underlying signature scheme is unique, there could exists many circuits that a * satisfies. If an attacker "used" a different one each time it decrypted, we could not extract a single forgery from the Goldreich-Levin bits.
For this next step in our progression, we will have to develop a new technique. Intuitively, we will develop a new special type of signature scheme. In the real usage of our signature scheme the holder of the signature key can sign any message (thought of as a circuit) f . However, there is an alternative way to generate the public signature parameters that takes in an extra input a * . In this alternative generation there will not exist any valid signatures on a circuit f such that f (a * ) = 1. Moreover, if no such signatures (signatures on f where f (a * ) = 1) are requested it is computationally hard to distinguish a normal set of parameters from an alternative set with input a * . With this special type of signature scheme, we can return to the approach of letting encryption for input a be a witness encryption of the NP statement that there is a signature on f where f (a) = 1. The proof of security will be a hybrid experiment where the first step is to change from a normal set of parameters to an alternative set for a * . Our special signatures are realized from information theoretically sound Non-Interactive Witness Indistinguishable Proofs (NIWIs) and commitments with perfect soundness.
Fully Secure IBE. Finally, we extend the ideas for building ABE for circuits to get adaptive security for IBE (without complexity leveraging). Intuitively, we execute a "partitioning" strategy like [4, 35] where the reduction algorithm splits identities into two disjoint sets: those it can generate private keys for and those it can use as a valid challenge ciphertext. Again, we will use a version of a special signature scheme. In the real usage the holder can sign any message (thought of as an identity). The alternative parameter generation will take as input a PRF key s and a specified number of bits in the output range; the input of the PRF F is a message. For this alternative parameter generation one can sign M if and only if F K (M ) = 0.
In the reduction we do a hybrid proof where the (hidden) range of the PRF is set to be approximately the number of queries, q, made by the attacker. This means that approximately 1/q fraction of the identities will be useful as a challenge ciphertext and the other 1 − 1/q the reduction can make a private key for. Since are partitioning is tighter to the 1/q probability than [35] we avoid the artificial abort issue that proof faced.
Building Witness Encryption Schemes
Conceptually, in our particular witness encryption scheme, a ciphertext consists of components -"puzzle pieces", if you will -that the decrypter puts together to compute the message-masking key. Our goal is to find the simplest manner to assemble such a "puzzle" for general NP relations using the framework of multilinear maps 5 . To this end, we identify the Exact Cover problem, one of Karp's original NP-complete problems (under Karp/Levin reductions). An instance of Exact Cover consists of a number n and a collection of subsets T1, .
. When I is a witness, the puzzle pieces {Ti : i ∈ I} fit together exactly to solve the puzzle [n] . There may be many witnesses, and therefore many sets of pieces that lead to a solution.
This "puzzle pieces" approach is reminiscent of what one sees in many previous schemes that use (cryptographic) bilinear maps, such as attribute-based encryption schemes [32] . However, bilinearity allows the decrypter to not only add, but also subtract, components. For this reason, as far as we know, attribute-based encryption schemes using bilinear maps can only enforce policies that are approximately equal in power to linear span programs. To prevent the "subtraction of puzzle pieces", we apparently need a stronger cryptographic tool. Accordingly, we use (cryptographic) multilinear maps [5] , which allow the "multiplication of puzzle pieces", but not division of them, which will work just as well.
Specifically, suppose we have a n-multilinear group family consisting of a sequence of groups G1, . . . , Gn of the same order p, together with generators g1, . . . , gn and a set of multilinear maps ei,j :
For convenience, we collapse the multilinear maps into a single polymorphic function e :
The multilinear map allows multiplication (in the exponent) up to degree n. There is no mechanism for division. Now, given an Exact Cover instance (n, T1, . . . , T ) and a n-multilinear group family, our witness encryption scheme is quite simple. To encrypt M ∈ Gn (we assume that the message can be encoded as a group element), generate random scalars a1, . . . , an ∈ Zp, and send a ciphertext that consists of C = M · g a 1 ···an n , and the "puzzle pieces
If the decrypter knows a witness
, it can decrypt in the obvious way using the multilinear map. In particular, it computes g a 1 ···an n = e(Ci 1 , . . . , Ci t ), and divides this value from C to recover M .
Intuitively, the construction is secure since the only way to make g a 1 ···an n is to find an exact cover of [n] . Formally, we base security on the assumed hardness of the "Decision Multilinear No-Exact-Cover Problem" -roughly, given an instance x of Exact Cover that has no solution, it is hard 5 Indeed, we also have a direct construction (omitted here) for the standard NP-complete problem of Satisfiability; however that construction is significantly more complex than the construction we provide here.
to distinguish the distribution (C1, . . . , C , g
where r is random and independent.
Unfortunately, this security assumption is intimately tied to the encrypter's particular NP relation instance. It would certainly be more satisfying to base security on a fixed, natural assumption that works for all instances. However, we prove that it is impossible to base the security of a witness encryption scheme via an efficient black box reduction on a simple assumption -i.e., on a non-interactive hardness assumption that is independent of the hardness of deciding the specific NP problem instance being encrypted. The underlying assumption must either change with the NP relation instance, or the complexity of breaking the assumption must be greater than the complexity of deciding the relation. We also note that it is impossible to construct a statisticallysound witness encryption scheme for NP unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses [26, 31, 3] .
Of course, constructing the "pure" cryptographic multilinear map envisioned by Boneh and Silverberg [5] remains a long-standing open problem. However, Garg, Gentry and Halevi [11] recently used ideal lattices to construct "approximate" or "noisy" cryptographic multilinear maps, which they call graded encoding systems. We show that their graded encoded systems suffice to construct our witness encryption scheme.
Other Related Work
As mentioned above, witness encryption, both as a notion and in terms of the applications that we envision, is interesting only as a non-interactive primitive. In the interactive setting, general secure two-party computation protocols [37, 16] suffice for an interactive analog of witness encryption, where the decrypter essentially "commits" to his witness before the encrypter sends a message [2] . From the completely different perspective of statistical zero-knowledge protocols, a concept similar in spirit to witness encryption has been studied under the heading of instance-dependent commitments (ID commitments, for short), starting as early as [34] . In an ID commitment, a party commits to a value m with respect to an instance x. Depending on whether x ∈ L or not, the commitment is required to be statistically binding or statistically hiding. Both interactive [30, 7] and non-interactive [34, 26, 27, 28, 7, 13] variants of ID commitment schemes have been studied in the literature, with recent work also considering the notion of efficient extractability [13] . However, non-interactive primitives have been considered only in a setting where statistical hiding is desired. These works can be seen as establishing the existence of statistical witness encryption schemes for a few specific languages known to be in SZK (more specifically, languages that possess certain kinds of hash proof systems [9] ). Indeed, it is impossible to construct such a statistical primitive for NP complete languages unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses [26] . It is intriguing that these works in the statistical zero knowledge literature considered a notion related to ours, despite coming from a very different perspective. However, we stress that no prior work considered the notion of witness encryption for general NP languages, which is the focus of this work. Furthermore, no candidate constructions for NP-complete languages were contemplated prior to our work, explicitly or implicitly.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide background on Garg et al.'s lattice-based "approximate"multilinear maps (a.k.a. "graded encoding systems") [11] .
Graded Encoding Systems: Definition
Garg, Gentry and Halevi (GGH) [11] defined an "approximate" version of a multilinear group family, which they call a graded encoding system. As a starting point, they view g α i in a multilinear group family as simply an encoding of α at "level-i". This encoding permits basic functionalities, such as equality testing (it is easy to check that two level-i encodings encode the same exponent), additive homomorphism (via the group operation in Gi), and bounded multiplicative homomorphism (via the multilinear map e). They retain the notion of a somewhat homomorphic encoding with equality testing, but they use probabilistic encodings, and replace the multilinear group family with "less structured" sets of encodings related to lattices.
Abstractly, their n-graded encoding system for a ring R includes a system of sets S = {S
α ∈ R} are disjoint (and thus form a partition of Si
consists of the "level-i encodings of α". Moreover, the system comes equipped with efficient procedures, as follows:
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Instance Generation. The randomized InstGen(1 λ , 1 n ) takes as input the security parameter λ and integer n. The procedure outputs (params, pzt), where params is a description of an n-graded encoding system as above, and pzt is a level-n "zero-test parameter".
Ring Sampler. The randomized samp(params) outputs a "level-zero encoding" a ∈ S0, such that the induced distribution on α such that a ∈ S , subject to bounds on the noise.
Multiplication. For u1 ∈ S
6 Since GGH's realization of a graded encoding system uses "noisy" encodings over ideal lattices, the procedures incorporate information about the magnitude of the noise.
Zero-test. The procedure isZero(params, pzt, u) outputs 1 if u ∈ S
(0) n and 0 otherwise. Note that in conjunction with the procedure for subtracting encodings, this gives us an equality test.
Extraction. This procedure extracts a "canonical" and "random" representation of ring elements from their leveln encoding. Namely ext(params, pzt, u) outputs (say) K ∈ {0, 1} λ , such that:
(a) With overwhelming probability over the choice of α ∈ R, for any two u1, u2 ∈ S (α) n , ext(params, pzt, u1) = ext(params, pzt, u2), 
Definition 2.2 (DGE No-Exact-Cover Assumption). The Decision Graded Encoding No-Exact-Cover Assumption is that for all instances x with no solution, all PPT algorithms A have negligible advantage against the Decision Graded Encoding No-Exact-Cover Problem.

Graded Encoding Systems: Realization
Concretely, GGH's n-graded encoding system works as follows. (This is a whirlwind overview; see [11] for details.) The system uses three rings. First, it uses the ring of integers O of the m-th cyclotomic field. This ring is typically represented as the ring of polynomials O = Z[x]/(Φm(x)), where Φm(x) is the m-th cyclotomic polynomial, which has degree N = φ(m). Second, for some suitable integer modulus q, it uses the quotient ring O/(q) = Zq[x]/(Φm(x)), similar to the NTRU encryption scheme [23] . The encodings live in O/(q). Finally, it uses the quotient ring R = O/I, where I = g is a principal ideal of O that is generated by g and where |O/I| is a large prime. This is the ring "R" referred to above; elements of R are what is encoded.
What does a GGH encoding look like? For a fixed random z ∈ O/(q), an element of S (α) i -that is, a level-i encoding of α ∈ R -has the form e/z i ∈ O/(q), where e ∈ O is a "small" representative of the coset α + I (it has coefficients that are very small compared to q).
if e1 · e2 is "small". This smallness condition limits the GGH encoding system to degree polynomial in the security parameter. Intuitively, dividing encodings does not "work", since the resulting denominator has a nontrivial term that is not z.
The GGH params allow everyone to generate encodings of random (known) values. The params include a level-1 encoding of 1 (from which one can generate encodings of 1 at other levels), and (for each i ∈ [n]) a sufficient number of level-i encodings of 0 to enable re-randomization. To encode (say at level-1), run samp(params) to sample a small element a from O, e.g. according to a discrete Gaussian distribution. For a Gaussian with appropriate deviation, this will induce a statistically uniform distribution over the cosets of I. Then, multiply a with the level-1 encoding of 1 to get a level-1 encoding u of a ∈ R. Finally, run reRand(params, 1, u), which involves adding a random Gaussian linear combination of the level-1 encodings of 0, whose noisiness (i.e., numerator size) "drowns out" the initial encoding.
To permit testing of whether a level-n encoding u = e/z n ∈ Sn encodes 0, GGH publishes a level-n zero-test parameter pzt = hz n /g, where h is "somewhat small" 7 and g is the generator of I. The procedure isZero(params, pzt, u) simply computes pzt · u and tests whether its coefficients are small modulo q. If u encodes 0, then e ∈ I and equals g · c for some (small) c, and thus pzt · u = h · c has no denominator and is small modulo q. If u encodes something nonzero, pzt · u has g in the denominator and is not small modulo q. The ext(params, pzt, u) procedure works by applying a strong extractor to the most significant bits of pzt · u. For any two u1, u2 ∈ S (α) n , we have (subject to noise issues) u1 − u2 ∈ S (0) n , which implies pzt(u1 − u2) is small, and hence pzt · u1 and pzt · u2 have the same most significant bits (for an overwhelming fraction of α's).
Garg et al. provide an extensive cryptanalysis of the encoding system, which we will not review here. We remark that the underlying assumptions are stronger, but related to, the hardness assumption underlying the NTRU encryption scheme: that it is hard to distinguish a uniformly random element from O/(q) from a ratio of "small" elements -i.e., an element u/v ∈ O/(q) where u, v ∈ O/(q) both have coefficients that are on the order of (say) q for small constant . 7 Its coefficients are on the order of (say) q 2/3 , while other terms -such as a numerator e or the principal ideal generator g -are much, much smaller. string x, and a message M ∈ M for some message space M, and outputs a ciphertext CT.
WITNESS ENCRYPTION
Decryption. The algorithm Decrypt(CT, w) takes as input a ciphertext CT and an unbounded-length string w, and outputs a message M or the symbol ⊥.
These algorithms satisfy the following two conditions:
• Correctness. For any security parameter λ, for any M ∈ M, and for any x ∈ L such that R(x, w) holds, we have that
• Soundness Security. For any x / ∈ L, for any PPT adversary A and messages M0, M1 ∈ M, there exists a negligible function neg(·), such that:
Remark 2. We stress that witness encryption does not require any setup algorithm.
The Security-Correctness Gap. We remark that the correctness stipulates that an algorithm can decrypt if x ∈ L it knows a witness w for the relation R. Security states that if x / ∈ L then no polynomial-time algorithm can decrypt. However, our definition is (intentionally) silent on the case when x ∈ L, but the algorithm does not know a witness for the relation R.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES FROM WITNESS ENCRYPTION
We turn to building cryptographic primitives from witness encryption. We show a progression of primitives starting with the basic case of Public-Key Encryption, then moving on to Identity-Based Encryption, and finally showing how to realize Attribute-Based Encryption for circuits. Each new step in the progression will be more challenging and require new techniques. We also give a construction of a fully secure IBE scheme.
We now formally describe our encryption systems. For building them we will assume the existence of a witness encryption scheme for an NP-Complete language L for which there exists a Karp-Levin reduction. We focus on presenting the constructions in this section and defer the proofs to the full-version.
Public Key Encryption
We now describe our public key encryption system in terms of three algorithms.
Setup PKE (1 λ ). The setup algorithm chooses a random PRG seed s ∈ {0, 1} λ . Next, it uses the PRG G : {0,
2λ . The public key PK = (t, λ) is the output of the PRG and the security parameter. The secret key SK = s is the seed.
Encrypt PKE (PK = (t, λ), M).
To encrypt the algorithm prepares an instance x such that x ∈ L if and only if t is in the range of G. It uses the KarpLevin reduction to the NP-complete language L to do this. Next, it computes Encrypt WE (1 λ , x, M) → C to encrypt the message M for the instance x. The output ciphertext is CT = (x, C).
The decryption algorithm is given an instance x and witness encryption ciphertext C. If the ciphertext was formed properly, the algorithm can use its knowledge of s to obtain a witness w that x ∈ L. Next, it calls Decrypt WE (C, w) to recover the encrypted message M .
Identity-Based Encryption
We now describe the four algorithms comprising of our IBE system. We assume the existence of a unique signature system, where on honest setup there will be exactly one signature that will verify. We also use GL(σ, r) to denote the Goldreich-Levin [15] hardcore bit of σ using randomness r. Recall, that the GL predicate is the bitwise inner product between σ and r.
Setup IBE (1 λ ). The IBE setup algorithm runs Setup-Signature(1 λ ) for the unique signature system. It sets the public parameters PP to be the signature verification key and the master secret key MSK to be the signature signing key.
KeyGen IBE (MSK, I).
The key generation algorithm simply computes a signature on the identity by calling Sign(MSK, I) → SK.
Encrypt IBE (PP, I, M).
The encryption algorithm will actually prepare two witness encryption ciphertexts. Suppose that signatures in our underlying signature scheme are of length k. The algorithm chooses a random r ∈ {0, 1} k . It prepares an instance x0 such that x0 ∈ L if and only if there exists a signature σ where GL(σ, r) = 0 and where Verify(PP, σ, I) = true. It computes Encrypt WE (1 λ , x0, M) → C0. Next, it creates a ciphertext for the opposite condition. It prepares x1 where x1 ∈ L if and only if there exists a signature σ where GL(σ, r) = 1 and σ verifies on I. It computes Encrypt WE (1 λ , x1, M) → C1. The output ciphertext is CT = (I, x0, x1, r, C0, C1 ).
Since we are using a unique signature scheme there will exist only one signature σ where Verify(PP, σ, M) = true. Thus, either x0 ∈ L or x1 ∈ L, but not both. For non-unique signature schemes, there might be multiple signatures that could verify and the above condition would not necessarily hold.
Decrypt IBE (SK = σ, CT = (I, x0, x1, r, C0, C1) ). The decryption algorithm first computes the bit b = GL(σ, r). Then it uses its knowledge of σ to obtain a witness w that x b ∈ L. Finally, it calls Decrypt WE (C b , w) to recover the encrypted message M .
Attribute-Based Encryption for Circuits
We now describe a construction of (Key-Policy) AttributeBased Encryption for circuits. In this setting, a private key corresponds to a boolean circuit f that takes n bit inputs. A ciphertext corresponds to an n bit value a. If f (a) = 1 then the user should be able to decrypt.
Let Com be a perfectly binding non-interactive commitment scheme 8 and let (P, V ) be a non-interactive zap [20] .
Setup ABE (1 λ ). The ABE setup algorithm generates commitments c1 = Com(0; r) and c2 = Com(0 n ; s). It sets the public parameters PP to be (c1, c2) and the master secret key MSK to be r.
KeyGen ABE (MSK, f) . The key generation algorithm simply outputs (f, π f ) where π f = P (x f , r). Here, r is the randomness used in generation of c1 and x f is the following NP-statement:
Note that f is the circuit for which the secret key is being issued. Also note that the proof π f will have size specified by fixed polynomial in λ, n, |f | denoted by μ(λ, n, |f |).
Encrypt ABE (PP, a, M).
The encryption algorithm prepares an instance x such that x ∈ L if and only if there exists a circuit g such that |g| ≤ max and a proof πg (of size μ(λ, n, |g|)) such that V (xg, πg) = 1 ∧ g(a) = 1 where xg is the NP-statement as defined in Equation 1 .
If f (a) = 1 and |f | ≤ max, the decryption algorithm uses π f to obtain a witness w to the fact that x ∈ L. Finally, it calls Decrypt WE (C, w) to recover the encrypted message M . 
Fully Secure Identity-Based Encryption
Now, we describe a fully secure IBE scheme for identities of length n. Let Com be a perfectly binding non-interactive commitment scheme and let (P, V ) be a non-interactive zap [20] . Let F be a PRF family from n bits to λ bits with seed length λ. Further let Fs(y) denote the PRF output on input y with s. For any t ∈ [λ], let F s,t (y) denote the t least significant bits from Fs(y).
. The IBE setup algorithm generates commitments c1 = Com(0; r), c2 = Com(0 λ ; R) and c3 = Com(0 log(λ) ; R ). It sets the public parameters PP to be (c1, c2, c3) and the master secret key MSK to be r.
KeyGen IBE (MSK, I).
The key generation algorithm simply outputs (I, πI ) where πI = P (xI, r). Here, r is the randomness used in generation of c1 and xI is the following NP-statement:
Note that I is the identity for which the secret key is being issued. Also note that the size of the proof πI will be some fixed polynomial in λ, |I|.
Encrypt IBE (PP, I, M).
It prepares an instance x such that x ∈ L if and only if there exists a proof πI (of appropriate size) such that V (xI, πI ) = 1 where xI is the NP-statement as defined in Equation 2. Next, it computes Encrypt WE (1 λ , x , M) → C. The output ciphertext is CT = (I, x , C) . ((I, πI) , CT = (I , x , C) ). If I = I then it uses its knowledge of πI to obtain a witness w to the fact that x ∈ L. Finally, it calls Decrypt WE (C, w) to recover the encrypted message M . Security Proof. The key idea in proving the security of the above scheme is to be able to execute a partitioning strategy for the secret keys of the adaptive IBE. This is very similar to [35] except that we do not have to deal with the issue of artificial aborts. We defer the proof to the full-version.
OUR CONSTRUCTION
Our witness encryption scheme is surprisingly simple. We use the Exact Cover problem, one of Karp's original NPcomplete problems. The instance is a number n and a collection of subsets T1, . . . , T ⊂ [n]. A witness is a set I ⊆ [ ] such that {Ti : i ∈ I} is a partition of [n]. We instantiate our scheme using the GGH graded encoding system; the scheme would be even simpler with a "pure" multilinear map.
Witness Encryption Using a Graded Encoding System
The GGH graded encoding system is probabilistic and does not offer a bijection between encodings and a message space. Therefore, we present our witness encryption scheme as a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). In a KEM, one encrypts a random key rather than a message. Then, the random key is used to encrypt the message -e.g., using a symmetric encryption scheme. In a sound witness encryption KEM, for any x / ∈ L, a PPT adversary should not be able to distinguish between the actual KEM key and a random string of the same length.
Encrypt(1
λ , x, M). The algorithm takes as input an Exact Cover instance x. The algorithm runs the InstGen algorithm to generate (params, pzt) ← InstGen(1 λ , 1 n ), where params is a description of a n-graded encoding system and pzt is a level-n zerotest parameter. The algorithm samples level-zero encodings ai ← samp(params) for i ∈ [n]. The ciphertext CT consists of:
as well as params, pzt, and a description of the exact cover instance x. The KEM key K is:
K ← ext(params, pzt, enc(params, n, a1 · · · an)).
Decrypt(CT, w = I).
The algorithm takes as input a ciphertext and a witness set
Proof. Suppose that a PPT adversary A can distinguish K (as output by Encrypt) from a uniformly random string with non-negligible advantage when the exact cover instance x has no witness. 
IMPOSSIBILITIES
In this section, we argue that it is unlikely that the hardness assumptions underlying the security of witness encryption schemes can be simplified significantly. In particular, we give two impossibility results.
First we note that existence of a statistically secure variant of a witness encryption scheme (Section 3) implies the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy [26, 31, 3 ]. Next we turn back to the computational variant of witness encryption (defined in Section 3) and show that a witness encryption scheme in the following scenario is impossible.
• The security of scheme is proved based on a fixed assumption, that does not depend on the specific instance of the language used in encryption.
• The security of our witness encryption scheme is lower than the hardness of deciding the instance x.
Consider an NP-complete language L and a corresponding witness encryption scheme (Encrypt, Decrypt) for the language L. It is clear from the impossibility result of [26, 31, 3] that a ciphertext c = Encrypt(1 λ , x, M) in the setting when x ∈ L can not information theoretically hide M . This implies that given c there exists an extraction function, denoted as Ext, that given a ciphertext c, runs in time T (an appropriate exponential function, say 2 λ ) and extracts the encrypted message M . Next we will argue that no such witness encryption scheme whose security can be reduced to a simple assumption exists. Proof. Let us start by assuming that there exists such a reduction R that uses (in a black-box manner) an adversary A (breaking the soundness of the encryption scheme) and breaks the underlying non-interactive assumption Ass. Now for our proof we will construct a meta-reduction M that uses this reduction R, simulates A for it and breaks the assumption on its own. We will prove this by a sequence of hybrids.
First we will specify some notation. Let f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 3n be any T -hard PRG (can be constructed using Thard OWF) where n is an appropriate polynomial in λ. Let L be the language such that y ∈ L if ∃w such that f (w) = y. Further let g be an NP-reduction such that g(y) ∈ L if and only if y ∈ L .
-H0: Execute R with inputs x, P where x, P are sampled as follows. Sample a string y uniformly in {0, 1}
3n
and set x = g(y). With overwhelming probability y with not be pseudorandom and hence x ∈ L. P is an instance of the assumption Ass sampled using V (1 λ ). R's calls to the adversary can be simulated by using the extractor function Ext. By soundness of the witness encryption scheme we have that R breaks the assumption Ass. The running time of this hybrid is T .
-H1: This hybrid is same as the previous hybrid except that y is sampled to be a pseudorandom string. Now we will have x ∈ L where x = g(y).
The indistinguishability of H0 and H1 follows from the T -hardness of the PRG.
-H2: This is the same as the previous hybrid except that instead of simulating the adversary using the function Ext (that runs in T -time) we extract the encrypted message using the Decrypt procedure using the witness corresponding to the NP-statement x.
Note that in the hybrid H2 the simulation of the adversary is done locally in polynomial time. Hence the reduction R can be used to break the assumption on its own. This is a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
